

DETECTIVE SENIOR CONSTABLE GRAY

Q1 - - - and Mr Lachlan Marshall at the Eden Police Station on Thursday, the 4th of February, 1999. The time by my watch is now is indicated as 12.00pm. As I've already mentioned to you, Mr Marshall, I'm investigating the 1998 Sydney to Hobart Yacht Race, and part of my inquiries is to speak to various people who were involved in the race, either directly or indirectly. So what I'd like to do today is to ask you some questions in relation to your involvement, but firstly, if you could just give me your full details. Your name?

A Lachlan Cupit Marshall.

Q2 And your date of birth?

A 15th of the 7th, 1942.

Q3 And your current address?

A 263 Imlay Street, Eden.

Q4 And your occupation?

A I'm managing director of a fishing company called Presnic Pty Limited.

Q5 O.K. Now I wonder if you'd start by just giving me some, giving me some background experience in relation to you and the sea the boating and that sort of thing?

A I've been a professional fisherman for 26 years. I have operated from Newcastle to Maple Island, top end of Tasmania. I've operated a string of vessels, at numerous times I've been representing New Zealand fishing companies with a fleet as large as seven

vessels under my command. Operating from as low as, as Hobart, vessels operating out of Hobart all along the New South Wales and Victorian coast. These days I operate two vessels out of Eden, trawlers, one of those is a steel vessel of 25 and a half metres, the other one is a timber vessel, 21.6 metres. Eden, my time in Eden has now been 15 years, out of Eden, and working out of and through into Bass Strait. The last seven or eight years, I've come ashore with only a few days at sea, and having partners or skippers driving my boats on my behalf. I'm heavily involved in the training of young men on, on the east coast of New South Wales with the TAFE organisation for their master's tickets, their engine driver's tickets, coxswain's and occupational health and safety. I'm chairman of a TAFE organisation, which is the driving force behind this. We're committed to safety within the industry and take a very dim view of a lot of the practices that have been plaguing our industry for many, many years. My involvement with the Sydney to Hobart commenced at 10 past 2.00, on the Sunday, I think, the day was Sunday, the day after the Sydney Hobart commenced when Sergeant Keith Tilman and one other junior officer arrived at my home seeking assistance in regards the Team Jaguar, which was dismast, disabled and required rescuing. He, he informs me that they refused to be airlifted off by helicopter and the only alternative we had was a sea rescue. I was aware of the sister ship to my own

vessel, the sister ship, Moira Elizabeth, was en route to Portland. I immediately rang that vessel to see if it was on phone range and he was, he was on his way to shelter at Gabo, had run into the storm, and was on his way to shelter at Gabo Island. I spoke to him about our dilemma. I advised him that I was on speaker, telephone and I had the two police officers in my office. I asked him could he help us in, in this, in this case, and he replied the sea was extremely large, it was very, very dangerous out there, but he would give it his best effort. So Keith Tilman spoke to him and made it quite clear to him that he wasn't to, to take any unnecessary risk and that he was ultimately in charge and it was his choice at what, if he, I put it to you this way. If, if he felt the need to abort then it was fine, O.K, by him, if he felt the need to do that. We gave him the last known position, and he proceeded to pursue the Team Jaguar. The, the time of getting there was something like around three hours as, as I recall, because they were heading into, into the weather and the speed could only be four or five knots they could make towards that, that particular On arriving at the last known position the, the Team Jaguar wasn't there. The vessel had drifted considerably. We were able to acquire a new position in which the, the skipper plotted on, onto his plotter, and then proceeded to pursue after that vessel. What we weren't aware of was

that the, that the speed in which this yacht was drifting at and, and after chasing that vessel all night, the, the skipper had then consistently replotting his position, realised the exact course that the wind and the currents was taking him, which was, as I recall, probably in a, it'd need to be confirmed by the skipper, but it would seem to be on a nor-easterly course. The, the vessel was rescued, I understand, in the early hours around about 5.00, half past 4.00 in the morning. During the, during the next, earlier part of that evening, Sergeant Keith Tilman made regular visits to my home, as we kept in touch with the vessels and he was aware that I had my own vessel, the Josephine Jean in shallow water here in Eden in the, in the of the land, and we'd had a number of calls of small boats, yachts, who was limping into Eden, who wanted tows into, into the heads. And the first incident, he, he asked me the sort of thing, you know, how much would I charge, and I was reluctant to put a figure on it because normally you'd just pick these boats up and tow them into, you don't, consider doing it for, for monetary gain. It has quickly become established these vessels were, they were just only tired, they weren't in, in any trouble, and Keith Tilman, with his wisdom, had decided to put a large fee on, on this and immediately all these yachts were suddenly, was O.K. That, that relieved us of that, that demand, and when the Miintinta, a Mayday was

issued for that, we were then released to pursue the rescue of that particular yacht. That was some time in the evening around 8 o'clock or taken a half hour or so.

Q6 What yacht was that?

A The Miintinta. It's spelt M-I-I-N-T-I-N-T-A, pronunciation is really not clear. We were given a position which and, and Keith Tilman to my office and a radio comment from the radio operator which was a, a William Volvoder, V-O-L-V-O-D-E-R, he'd made the, the visual statement, he was only a couple of miles off Eden and he could see the lights of Eden. But the position he gave us it was 42 miles off Eden, and I said to Keith Tilman there was no way he could see Eden if he was that far off shore, and the nature of the stress of which these, this radio operator was on, as we were receiving it on the VHF, I zeroed the, the seconds, and, which put him only a couple of miles of Eden and only two or three miles from the Josephine Jean. I asked the skipper, Olle Hyneson, if he could pursue that position and that was, he said, no problems, so away he went, obviously the vessel wasn't there. In the meantime a steamer which was travelling down the coast by the name of Union Rutumar, I believe it's spelt R-U-T-U-M-A-R, a container vessel, had picked up the Mayday and was pursuing to the original position we were given. I asked the crew to venture to the deck because then it was well into dark, if you

could see the lights of a steamer off shore, and the reply was, "Yes", and I asked him what they were doing, he said, "It's going further out to sea", which then confirmed the original position that the radio operator of this yacht was correct. We plotted the position on the plotter and on our estimated speed, it'd be two and half to three hours before we could get there. Sergeant Keith Tilman was very concerned by the nature of what was coming over the VHF, and he made the statement to me, or words to this effect, we won't get there in time. They were in very dire straits. I relayed that to Olle and he said, "I'll do my best", and he took off, he opened the speed up as much as he could with safety. Sergeant Keith Tilman gave him the same instructions as he did with the previous skipper of the Moira Elizabeth, Moira Elizabeth, that he was totally in charge and that at any stage he felt that the vessel was at risk, he, he was to abort. Olle being a very seasoned fisherman from, from Iceland and was accustomed to extreme weather conditions and very skilled at his craft. He took that boat, boat out, to that position. We understand the, the, the, the Union Rutumar was relieved of that position as we approached, he was only standing by and the vessel, the Josephine Jean, went in and picked these sailors up. From the reports of the skipper and from my communications by mobile phone, which we had in contact right through the entire rescue, which I rang the vessel regularly of

half hour, one hour intervals, we put the rope on the vessel and proceeded to tow. After approximately one hour the, the tow line broke. He immediately then moved the vessel into a position again and attempted to put the tow rope on. By then the, I understand the crew was in such a physical state that they couldn't even pick the rope up, they were physically and mentally, and totally exhausted. Somehow or other they did, they got a rope back on the bollard and after a very short period the bollard had broke, a, a stainless bollard which the owner of the vessel has in his possession today. The vessel was half full of water, so the weight of that was quite, quite, quite serious. Olle, the skipper had made then the decision that it was too dangerous to continue to try and, and salvage the vessel and he advised the crew they had to abandon the ship and, and we'll take them on board the Josephine Jean. The only way he could see it to be done safely was to hop into a life raft and then, then eventually transfer to the Josephine Jean, which was done successfully without any loss of life. However, some of the crew were badly bruised and battered and the evidence certainly was there the next day when they arrived on the way home, there was not one of them that wasn't battered and bruised in extensively, so they'd had quite a hiding during that night. The, the Josephine Jean arrived back in Eden, I believe around, deary me, 1.30, 20 to 2.00, something like that, the

next day, which would be the 27th of the 12th, 12th.

Q7 27th or the 28th?

A No, 28th, 28th Yeah, it was Monday the 28th the 12th, around about 20 to 2.00. We took the, the crew ashore, they only carried their, their, the clothing they had. They had lost everything. We took them home, showered them, fed them. The state of that crew was in, in a, in a thing that I'd had some Christmas ham in the fridge and frozen bread in the freezer, I brought the frozen bread out to put it in the microwave to thaw it, and one of the, the crew members had actually put the ham, with no butter within the, the slices of frozen, frozen bread and immediately begin to stuff it down his throat. They were in, in such, that sort of demonstrates the sort of hunger and the shock that they were in. When I pointed out to him the bread was still frozen, he said, "It's all right, it was beautiful". The next morning, which was then the 29th, after some sleep the two young women that was on that boat, the, the shock had actually then set in and they were of the view that they were 20 minutes from death. They'd hung on, they'd gone to sleep on the bilge pumps, they'd apparently failed at the end, and each time they heard the vessel was coming it rebuilt their, their inner strength to hang on. They, they, they were of the view that had we not arrived in, in that time frame they would have not lasted much longer. And that was also the view, I think, that

Sergeant Keith Tilman had received from the radio communications. Some time during that rescue William Volvoder was relieved as radio operator and one of the younger women took over as operator. She had had some experience overseas and was a, a competent radio operator. Her stretch was just equally as evident on the VHF. That's about all I can tell you of the rescues in, in that particular case.

Q8 O.K. Just a couple of things in relation to the rescues. You mentioned that your vessel, I think it was the Josephine -?

A Josephine Jean.

Q9 Josephine Jean, you mentioned that it was heading for shelter. Can you just explain to me what that means?

A No, originally I said the Moira Elizabeth.

Q10 Sorry, Moira -

A Moira Elizabeth Gabo Island is a natural protection in, in the weather was coming from the south, and you can shelter very comfortably in, in calm conditions on the north side of Gabo Island, it's very good anchorage.

Q11 Right.

A That vessel was going in behind Gabo, to drop anchor and till, till the storm was over.

Q12 O.K. Now what were the name of your two boats again?

A The Moira Elizabeth. It's not my vessel, I was managing it on behalf of the owners.

Q13 Right, O.K.

A And the Josephine Jean.

Q14 O.K. Now when you said they kept, can plot a course, as far as we're, something's moving, I suppose it's a prediction where something's going to be in an hour. How do they go about doing that?

A O.K. Most of our fishing vessels today have, have a GPS navigational systems on board into a plotter or computer with charts on it and these particular machines, actually you can see yourself on the screen, it has latitude, longitude, you can put weight points in, you can say I wish to go there, you put a weight point in, it'll tell you what course you have to go on your current speed, how long it's going to take you to get there and all this relevant, important information. We use it for recording all our trawl grounds, wrecks, reefs, anything relevant to our trade, and you're given a little, a little a set of 4 inch hard drive disk, you can put it in your pocket and take it home with you.

Q15 All right.

A In the case of the rescue of the Team Jaguar, when we were given its location, we plotted that position on the chart.

Q16 All right.

A You can see where it is against where you are, it'll give, it'll give you your true bearing to that position, the, how far it is and once you're under way, it'll tell you how long it's going to take you to get there. Now in, in the case of the Team Jaguar, 'cause

it moved, it, it had drifted, and it was drifting at something around 4 to 5 knots. Now we weren't aware of that at the time but when we were become aware of it, we plotted a new position, and then that gave you, by keeping each of those positions as it moved, on the chart, it gave you the direction of which it was drifting.

Q17 All right.

A And the skipper then was able to then, because he could not travel much faster than what the drift was - - -

Q18 Mm.

A - - - for safety reasons, and he, he, he reported to me that he actually laid the Moira Elizabeth over on its side on two different occasions and if it wasn't for the, the sturdy stability of that vessel, we could have lost that vessel. So he decided after chasing this boat for quite some time that he was never going to catch it, so he altered course to go ahead of the vessel and come down to the vessel, and that's how we picked that vessel up successfully.

Q19 O.K. Now did he in fact tow Team Jaguar back to Eden?

A Yes, he did.

Q20 O.K. Now I believe he arrived around about the 1 o'clock on the 28th, all right. O.K. Now you mentioned the word, zero to seconds, that was in relation to - - -

A Yes, yes.

Q20 - - -

A Miintinta.

Q21 Miintinta.

A Yes, we had the latitude and longitude, I just
don't recall what, yes, 36 degrees, 57 minutes, and,
was the, the latitude.

Q22 All right.

A What I did is zeroed, took, took the 5 out and put a
zero in, which brought me in, into two mile off shore.

Q23 O.K.

A Which I was wrong in doing so because he'd given the
right, the correct position.

Q24 So that explains why he could see the lights?

A Well, we, we don't know because we know from our own
experience you can't see the lights from that far off
shore.

Q25 At 42 miles?

A No.

Q26 All right.

A And of course the, it was raining and heavy seas and
all the rest of it, so - - -

Q27 Mm.

A - - - visibility is only up to probably 20 miles - - -

Q28 All right.

A - - - in good conditions.

Q29 Mm.

A So we don't know what he saw.

Q30 All right. Do you, are you aware of what happened to
that vessel at sea, did they explain to you what

happened?

A The, the, the skipper who rang me when, when he broke the bollard, the bollard had broken off the vessel and he said, "We can't, we have to let it go", and it, it seemed to drift on a north easterly course, and it was never seen again.

Q31 Well, so far as you are aware that boat is still at sea?

A Well, it's either sunk or it's drifting endlessly.

Q32 Mm.

A I, I would, again from what the crew has told me, she was half full of water and still taking water - - -

Q33 Mm.

A - - - and my, my thoughts are that it eventually it would have sunk.

Q34 Yeah. Are you aware of what, what got them into this position, so far as water on board, were they dismasted or -?

A I had a report which, which was, and these are the words of Brian Emerson the owner/skipper of the vessel.

Q35 Yeah.

A And, on, in his report, and I've no way, able to tell the validity of it, but he tells me that the bilge pumps had failed. He had two brand new bilge bumps, and they had failed and there was something else, which he wasn't sure of where the water was coming in. My thoughts are that if the rubber and, and the froth and that which often is the case of damage in these sort of

sea conditions, it may've been coming in through the skin fitting.

Q36 All right.

A But I'm not in a position to say how that water was getting access into the vessel.

Q37 All right.

A But it was making water slowly all the time.

Q38 O.K. Now, were you at all monitoring the radio during the night?

A No, no, I was, well, I was monitoring my vessel - - -

Q39 Mm.

A - - - I have a satellite communication system with these vessels.

Q40 O.K.

A And, it's called and I was using that in a mobile phone. The VHF, I have a, a registered radio station at home but I no longer use it - - -

Q41 Mm.

A - - - and it's disconnected because I have these more sophisticated communication systems.

Q42 All right.

A And they're, they're confidential and they're, they have no interference and so forth. The, the radio room at the Coastal Patrol, which is only just across the road from my place, a few hundred yards, it was in full contact with all the vessels during that 40-odd hours.

Q43 All right. Are you aware from where Mr Emerson and his crew come from?

A They come from Sydney.

Q44 All right. O.K.

A Well, that's, the skipper does.

Q45 The skipper does.

A And some of the, the male crew do - - -

Q46 All right.

A - - - and one of the, the, one of the young ladies is from overseas.

Q47 All right. O.K. O.K. Now, you brought some documents along today, and there's a couple of things that you want to explain to me.

A O.K.

Q48 So far as, just before we do, what's your qualifications so far as the sea?

A Well, I, I, I hold a Master 4 of Competency.

Q49 All right.

A A Marine Engine Driver Grade 2.

Q50 All right.

A They are my official qualifications as, as a seaman.

Q51 O.K.

A Other than the, the many, many years' of experience running vessels.

Q52 All right. O.K. All right, if you could explain the things you've brought.

A I have brought in with me today - - -

Q53 Yeah.

A - - - which is a training manual used by the TAFE organisation in New South Wales, it's called Boating

Manual by Captain Dick Gandy. He's recognised throughout Australia and the various organisations as a, as a, it's recognised as one of the better training manuals available today. It is used extensively from coxswains, deckhand certificates, right up to the various masters levels of master 5, master 4, master 3, competency based. It's, it's a type of book that is, it's a lesson, it has a question and answer type form and it deals in all sort of navigation, rigging, weather forecasting and so on and so on. This particular, I have taken, which I've given a senior sergeant here today, copies of this, the information taken from this particular book.

Q54 M'mm.

A And in the first stage of it, it, it gives a weather map, showing a low pressure in eastern Bass Strait, not unsimilar to the low pressure that was formed on that particular day, the 27th. The, the slight variation is the low pressure was a little higher up the coast and more centred at Green Cape, where this was a little bit lower. The facts are very much the same, in as much that any low pressure the, the wind travels in a clockwise, clockwise condition, and on that basis, which is a, as an established known fact, that were going to have southerly sou-westerly conditions. The, the next page I have, it, it shows you a, that actual clockwise condition for a low pressure and anti clockwise for a high pressure. These are basically

training stuff. The next page I have is part of the Beaufort scale, which is page 331, chapter 11, on meteorology. It, it shows you the wind strengths for various conditions, for example, strong wind warning. You're experience, you're going to experience winds of 22 to 27 knots with a 3 metre waves. This is a standard scale, a Beaufort scale, when you get to, to strong gales, you're talking about 41 to 47 knots and 7 metre waves. In the case of this particular day, a storm warning was current, and it is 48 to 55 nautical miles per hour and winds, wave heights of 9 metres. This is a predicted, going on, which has been used for tens and tens of years. In this particular case, we also were faced with a strong current running down the east coast. This is also documented in this training manual, and that's on page 295, chapter 9, "Sea surface currents in Australian waters. December, January, February", and it gives you the currents all around Australia and into, into the Pacific Ocean. And by the thickness of the lines, it has a scale here of the percentage likelihood you will incur that current. And reading those scale, you're reading it up to 71 per cent chance that the current is going to run 3 to 4 knots down the east coast of New South Wales to Gabo Island. This is something that we seamen are fully aware of and at times that current can get a lot stronger. Having known the fact that the, that current was running very strong, and you're having weather

coming from the south, you've got two natural a, what's the word, two natural, word to use, but you've got two natural forces, is a better word, facing each other. Therefore, you're going to experience wave heights and sea conditions much greater than scale 10 of, which is storm conditions of 9 metres. And, and I'm, I'm stating here that this was predictable, the weather conditions that day, once the storm warning was up, it was predictable that you were going to, at least get 9 metre waves, just by the training manual. Once, once you've known that there were strong currents running into the face of that weather, therefore, it is logical and common sense to all seamen that that weather conditions, that sea conditions are going to be far severer than the normal scale, and that's what took place that, night, day.

Q55 O.K. Now, so what actually, are you able to sort of tell me what low pressure system is?

A Yes. Yeah, this is the low, well, they're low pressure.

Q56 Yeah.

A And it, it, it, as it is, it's. the, the isobars get very low, the pressure gets very low, I just forget, don't know what it was that day, 900 and something whatever the word they use, and the isobars have around it, it's very, very close, which gives you an indication of the, the strength of the, of it, and the force of the winds you're going to incur. But

even not knowing all that you, you were given by, by the radio on, on the emergency channels, every half hour on the hour, you're getting a strong wind warning, then it was upgraded to gale warning it was upgraded to a storm warning. You were given the station reports, such as Wilsons Promontory, which is the first warning that we use as fishermen on this coast, and any other mariner because most, not all, but most of our severe weather comes from the south, with exceptions of, we get some low depressions, which have been ex cyclonic conditions up at Queensland, turn in to rain depressions that come down the coast, but in the main, most of our weather comes from the south, and it comes out of the Antarctic, it hits Wilsons, the first prominent, main, part of the mainland, which has a weather station. The next one is at Kingfisher Bay, which is well exposed off, off Lakes Entrance, the next one is Gabo Island, which is the most exposed area, then it approaches New South Wales and Green Cape. So as those fronts and low pressures move up the coast the, you can track the, the speed it's coming and, and the velocity of the weather and sea conditions. And in this particular case it was no different. The, when the strength of the, the, the storm warning had been issued, it was, low pressure then came in, was formed and wind strengths have reportedly around 78, 79 knots at Wilsons Promontory. That was broadcast on the half hour, on the hour, to all emergency stations and which

I would have thought every yacht should have been monitoring. We, we believe that the, the, the service vessel that was escorting the, the fleet down would have received that forecast and then it would have offloaded it to the boats. The same has occurred as the winds strengths improved at, increased at at Kingfisher, then Gabo, and that's all part of the thing, and you can still get those forecasts back from the Meteorology Department today, you can back date them, they'll give you a print-out, as to how they were, progressed through.

Q57 All right.

A So you, you can obtain that, the progress of it. So we as seamen use that, 'cause quite often you may get a strong wind warning or a gale warning at Wilson Promontory and, and it's not travelling very fast, so you're able to have the fishermen complete the day's work in safety before returning to port, because you can monitor the progress of it coming up the coast.

Q58 All right.

A If it's coming very quickly and, and, and at times it can increase in strength, as this one did, because of the low pressure, you know then you've got to get out of there.

Q59 All right. Now, from your experience, would you send your boats out in conditions like that?

A No, no. I would not, and I, and it was very irresponsible to go out into those conditions.

Q60 Now, from your experience also, whether it's a motor boat or a sail boat, if they, a vessel comes into that sort of situation or, or experiences that sort of, those sort of weather conditions, whose decision is it to take shelter?

A Once you're at sea, it is the master's decision - - -

Q61 All right.

A - - - at, at sea, to, he's ultimately responsible for the safety of that vessel and it's his decision.

Q62 All right. O.K. Would you be able to explain to me what the salvage rights are, basically. How does that work?

A O.K. There's, there's two types of salvage rights, as I understand it. There's one where you salvage a vessel which is adrift at sea, and there's no people on board. There's another type of salvage, where personnel is on board and they're asking for assistance of tow, that type of thing, and they, they come under two different insurance type - - -

Q63 Yeah.

A - - - policies. That's my understanding of it.

Q64 O.K. Now, is there anything you'd like to, to tell me today in relation to your views, in relation to the Sydney to Hobart race last year, so, so far as you're concerned?

A Yes. I, I, I believe that the majority of the fleet acted irresponsibly and continued to race. The, the larger vessels who had broken through or to, the, had

gone into Bass Strait a little earlier, before the low pressure had really increased to its, its ultimate intensity, had already encountered strong winds and big seas and in particular the first one to come up, as I understand it with the Mayday, was the Team Jaguar. It was very obvious then what was on because of the, the station reports and the constant warnings by, by Melbourne radio. The, the medium sized vessels and the small fleet were then fully aware of what was ahead of them. Knowing this and, and, and the fact that they should be aware of what I've just, just described in the training manuals, I believe it was irresponsible to continue to race in those conditions. They were putting themselves, their vessel and their crew at risk.

Q65 All right. Do you have any suggestions from your experience being in the game for so long in relation to what could be done about this sort of thing? What would you like to see, I mean as a member of the public and as a member of a rescue type thing?

A I, I believe that the Sydney Yacht Club has also a part to play in this. I think that they are also partially responsible. I think in so many types of sport we have, horse racing, car racing and, and yacht racing, such as the Melbourne Yacht Club, they, they, they postpone or abort a, a particular sporting event in the interest of safety. I think in this particular case, when once it was well known that the conditions were,

they should have through the, through the, the escort vessel, I think it would have been very responsible to, to abort that race in those conditions. Certainly the Melbourne, their sister club, the Melbourne held over for 24 hours, the commencement of that race, which was from Melbourne to Hobart, which is in conjunction with the Sydney to Hobart, they held it over for 24 hours, and that was a very responsible decision by those people in that club.

Q66 Do you think it's a situation where the CYCA, who issue their weather, need to be more, need to be stronger about the potential of the weather?

A I think so. I think so, and, and as I said, I think they're, they're, well, maybe not equal but partially accountable for this as well as, as the masters of those vessels.

Q67 So from your experience, if you got weather conditions given to you prior to the Sydney to Hobart, if you were a yachtsman, and you were told that winds were going to be 48 to 55, as predicted on the, on the day, or the day before, you being a person with great experience, would check your tidal, or your current chart, and you would notice that a particular tide or current will be possibly around that time and you were also aware of the lows which do come up during this period.

A Yes.

Q68 You could with your experience, look at that and say, "Mm, well this looks like it could go to 64, 70, in

excess of 70 knot winds"?

A There's every likelihood of that, and Bass Strait is one of the worst, or most notorious waters in the world
- - -

Q69 Yeah.

A - - - and we all know that, and you must treat it with a greater care than you would probably elsewhere.

Q70 Would that determine, you, if you were a skipper on one of these yachts, would that make you form an opinion, look I don't think we'll race?

A Well, had I been off Sydney or Botany or Wollongong, I would have been, watched it very closely because I know that I can go, I can go into Bermagui or Eden, and I would watch because often that weather can start to abate, as quickly as it comes.

Q71 All right.

A Being in the yacht race and, and sports minded, I would pursue it till I was of the view that, well, this weather's not going away, and we're going to have to face it, then I would abort and go into, yeah, go into shore.

Q72 All right. O.K. O.K. Well, that's all I've got to ask you. Is there anything else you'd like to say?

A No, I think I've covered it pretty well.

Q73 O.K.

A You can keep that.

Q74 O.K.

A

Q75 The time is now 12.37pm. This interview is now
concluded.

INTERVIEW CONCLUDED