

SENIOR CONSTABLE UPSTON

Q1 This is an electronically recorded interview between Senior Constable David Upston of the Sydney Water Police and Jeff Cordell at the Hobart CIB on Friday, the 12th of the 3rd, '99. The time on my watch is 11.57 and also seated to my immediate left is Detective Senior Constable Stewart Gray from the Bega Detectives' Office. Mr Cordell, prior to conducting the interview I mentioned a number of things to you about the Sydney to Hobart Yacht Race and Detective Senior Constable Gray and myself are making inquiries for the New South Wales State Coroner in regards to the race and the subsequent deaths of six sailors, and we're making inquiries incidences that may have occurred either indirectly or directly in relation to the deaths, so, from a starting point, you obviously sailed in the Sydney to Hobart Yacht Race.

A Yes, I did.

Q2 And what was the name of your yacht?

A The bot in the race was known Kendell, named as a sponsored name, it's normally sailed as Andoril.

Q3 O.K. And just for the purpose of the record could you please state your full name and date of birth and address?

A Full name is Jeffrey Peter Cordell, my date of birth 25th of August, '61, and my residential address is 941 Oceana Drive, Tranmere, Tasmania.

Q4 O.K. Are you the owner of, of that yacht?

A Yes.

Q5 And how long have you had it for?

A That yacht I've had for nearly three years.

Q6 O.K. And you had to, you brought the yacht from new or you had it built?

A No, we bought it secondhand in boat was quite well known in it's heyday as it's, it's 18 years old and we brought it down to Hobart and have done three Sydney to Hobarts in it.

Q7 O.K. And how many people sailed with you on this year's 1998 Sydney to Hobart Yacht Race?

A The crew number was 8 and that's normal for an offshore event.

Q8 O.K. All right. Well, can we take you to point perhaps on the 27th of December, 1998, of last year, where you commenced the race at 1.00pm on the 26th, you left Sydney Heads and you travelled down the coast south towards Tasmania. Can you go to a point where you started experience adverse weather or sea conditions and just let us know basically what you experienced from there?

A I think that most people would have told you that the, the first day was fairly fast and enjoyable, good nor'easterly breezes but it wasn't till about, I estimate, unfortunately all my logs got damaged but I'd estimate around about early afternoon of the 27th that we started we feel that the weather was freshening and starting to change direction, going around to the sou'

west, and fairly rapidly it, it started to build from, I don't know, around 20 knots but fairly rapidly got up into the 40 or 50 knots a bit before, say, 1 o'clock in the afternoon.

Q9 And then what happened after that?

A Well, the, the weather continued to, to increase, I'd say that by, within two hours it was, roughly up, well into the 60s and we were expecting, we were expecting that, perhaps not 60, we felt that the forecast was indicating a bit over 40, we'd expect some periods where it was up around 50, maybe a bit more, but it certainly was well over that as the afternoon progressed on.

Q10 M'mm.

A It's worth noting that we were also expecting to abate, at one point on the forecast it did say that the weather would have a tendency to abate as we cleared the coastline, so, you know, we were getting quite surprised that the wind strength got up, sitting on continually, I suppose around 60, 65 knots, for perhaps an hour, maybe a bit longer, and maybe, maybe two hours even, but then it did just progressively creep up and up and up and eventually we were getting wind strength measured on fairly new wind instruments at 80 knots true.

Q11 That's quite a considerable rise in, in accordance with the weather instructions that you were given earlier?

A Yes, well, we certainly weren't expecting anything like

-
that, I mean there was a storm warning issued and we were expecting that these occasional gusts I suppose you'd call them or periods of 50 knots, as why it was deemed a storm warning but I wouldn't say at any stage anyone expected 80 knots.

Q12 O.K. Were you present at the weather briefing at the CYCA prior to the race?

A I wasn't present I had two representatives from my boat, one of them is quite an experienced sailor from Sydney and if you needed a second person to interview on the boat, his name's Bill Sykes, he was the sailing master on Atara the year that John Quinn was rescued
- - -

Q13 Yes.

A - - - so a very competent seaman. We sent Bill and another one of our crew, Ian Davidson, to that briefing.

Q14 O.K. And when they returned and got everybody together then of course they briefed the whole vessel in regards to the weather, or what is the normal procedure?

A The normal procedure was that most of us had gone home, that's why I didn't, being based in Tasmania, I flew home for Christmas, whereas Andy, although he's Tasmanian, decided to stay up there over that period and Bill being a resident of Sydney was still there, so, the evening or the Christmas evening and really talked about the weather prior to the race that morning over breakfast.

Q15 O.K. Do you have a weather fax on board your vessel?

A Yes, we do, we've got a a personal computer and associated software with that.

Q16 Did you rely on that weather information interpolating the, the information that was received from there?

A Well, initially we used the information that we got from the met bureau, the, the information that we got through initially, the, the briefing, although, I don't put a lot of weight on that because the briefing was on the 24th and the race was on the 26th, so, we look for more recent things, I'd been following it in Hobart, Bill had been getting information of the, of the web, as well as ringing up a lot of his contacts around Sydney.

Q17 And when you received the information of the web, what model were you receiving that from, was it locally, Australian, overseas

A Well, we, we tend to use the Bureau of Meteorology web pages, that's how we, we access it, and I understand that most of the modelling, the models actually do change, it's not clear to me which model was used to give those forecasts.

Q18 O.K. All right. Now, let's, let's go back again, now, to you were experiencing 70 knots of breeze, still heading south, what happened then?

A Well, we were getting quite concerned, I was, I was, as every yachtsman would be, we were concerned that the, the weather we were experiencing was quite different to

-
what we were expecting from the weather information broadcast from Telstra race control and we were considering our options and starting to sort of, we'd obviously gone down into our storm sails, we, we only had a storm jib up, but we were quite comfortable, things weren't, weren't going too bad, it was just wet and miserable and with this feeling that the weather would abate, we were thinking that it'd either move through and as we cleared the coast things would get better but then we heard we, we changed our scenario around a bit, we normally have four people on each watch and we changed that around a bit as the weather became more extreme and it was decided that that I would go below deck and, as the most experienced helmsman and most familiar with the boat that I'd go below and, and maintain radio watches, increase our navigation side of it, we normally write a lat/long down at least once an hour but we increased that to 15 minutes, get weather information, do all that sort of stuff, secure stuff that's slinging around, just a lot of the housekeeping that, that we do, and I, I was down and the first call I heard was and their radio operator said words to the effect that I don't know whether this is legal, but we're getting 80 knots here, and that sort of, you can understand why they were worried about that because, you know, you're not supposed to disclose third party information but, I mean, it seemed fairly silly to me at 80

-

knots you'd broadcast it to anyone that wanted to listen, so, I was really appreciative of the sense that the, the crew of gave. The only problem was that they had difficulty getting a position when they were, they initially said, I forget the exact coordinates but I think the longitude was initially given as 148, when we were in fact on 144, so I thought well we're getting bad weather and a good two or three hundred mile from here, so, although it sort of makes you a little bit cautious, there's still, there's just a little doubt in my mind but nothing of intense concern at that point. The next thing to happen was that we were getting a steering technique and the boat was travelling quite well, Gary Ison, who was the watch leader on the other watch, was steering, very competent and experienced sailor with 10 or 12 Sydney to Hobarts, he got knocked off a wave, it was just a normal wave and a little wave came behind it and just basically flipped us off the top of it and down the front of the wave and that was our first knockdown. Gary was flung from the helming position across from, he was steering on the starboard side, and landed on the lifelines on the portside, one of the lifelines was sheared, three mil wire which was only 9 months old, it's new wire, and he landed quite heavily on top of that lifeline, his tether fortunately kept him from going the next step, which was overboard and he was literally hanging on for dear life, straddling the top lifeline, so, you

know, of course there was people flung off the rail and it took, it seemed like an eternity to, to get him off that line and get the boat back in control, but we did that, and, and, you know, Gary assured us that he was, he was O.K. although at the time I thought he, he's no doubt got a, I was surprised that he hadn't broken a rib or something like that, because he'd literally been thrown a couple of metres. So we settled down again and we were really starting to consider turning back and then we heard the sked and we listening actually a lot to Sword of Orion's supporting Team Jaguar, and at the time I thought that these guys are superb seamen, they were actually, the guys on Team Jaguar were quite distressed and they were just keeping them busy, keeping them to think logically, the Team Jag guys didn't seem to, they were concerned that their, their engine, they couldn't run their engine because they had lines around their prop, but, you know, the Team Jag, the Sword of Orion reminded them that they should keep charging their batteries and batten down and rest and, non-one's sort of telling them anything untrue, they were saying you're going to have a rough night but you'll be O.K. if you keep your radio good order and keep the boat bailed out and try and prevent any water ingress and just hang in there and give us a call any time, so they were sort of a like a crisis management, I'd suppose you'd say, and then the sked came along and saw them, confirmed that they were, they

-
were probably, well they were getting over 80 knots on deck and as Bill Sykes knew the guys and spoke very highly of them, some are professional sailors, he said, he said to me, well, I trust these guys and with the supporting information from we decided that at that point that we should turn back.

Q19 Can you recall what time of day that was, where most of the conversation was happening between the Sword of Orion and Team Jag and then ultimately led to your decision.

A I, yeah, it's, I would say early afternoon, was when I first heard them, 'cause certainly Team Jag were in trouble before we were really, considering our options, you know, as a fairly early retirement in the afternoon, I could only guess at early afternoon, sometime between 12.00 and 2.00.

Q20 O.K. That's on the 27th?

A That's right, yes.

Q21 And after that you decided then to retire from the race?

A No, we didn't retire, we decided that because we had information, at the time that sked, Sword of Orion were very close to us, we actually had Business Post Naiad within three mile of us and Sword were probably five or six mile ahead of us, and we were really happy because that's a noted boat and to be in so close, you know, we were, we were obviously very pleased to be so far up the fleet. I've lost my line

of thought.

Q22 O.K. Well, we, we just trying to decide on whether you, you mentioned earlier that you turned back.

A Yes. O.K. We turned back, we wanted, because we knew that there was still adverse weather ahead, there was obviously no hope that had Sword at conditions of 60 knots we would've just hung in there and gone through but because of such a noted boat and, and Rager's information, we decided it wasn't prudent to continue with no likely abating of weather and that was our fundamental reason as we wanted to, with the weather supposedly moving sou'east, we wanted to create separation as quickly as possible, and the best thing to do would be to head north.

Q23 And, and you did that for how long?

A Well, we did that, I, we did that really for another 12 hours, I guess you'd say, the time we turned around was pretty well straight after the, the second sked which I think was, gee, now that's a bit fuzzy, it must have been 3 o'clock, 4 o'clock, something like that, maybe a bit later than that, we'd probably gone for another hour but I remember actually calling Telstra race control and getting an update because I was thinking at the time that we'd given them lat and long and they were expecting us to go south, had something untoward happened, we would certainly have needed them to be looking north of that position rather than south.

Q24 Yeah.

-

A So, we did that for clarity. About 8 o'clock I came on deck and we relieved Gary and Bill Sykes and one or two of the crew and continued doing that until, well, probably midnight, 1 o'clock, and by that stage, weather had abated and we were starting to get some protection from the land but then we saw flares which we believe were, later believed were of the sunken yacht, they appeared to be quite close but as it turned out, they, they were a good 10 mile away, we were actually thinking they might be hand flares rather than rockets, so they were a little bit deceiving. We reported that to Telstra race control on HF radio and told them that we were heading to offer assistance which Lou Carter acknowledged, we then went onto VHF because we could hear some chatter about a boat obviously lost, we made the assumption that'd lost their GPS and they were just trying to pick out the codes to work out where they were, we weren't entirely sure what was going on because there were so many Maydays and distress situations being handled.

Q25 Do you recall the name of that boat?

A Well, not at the time, no, at that stage we, we'd heard a merchant ship and I can't remember the name of it but it was medium sized merchant ship that was communicating with them and it was clear to us that they weren't entirely sure where they were either and so we jumped in and said we had a, we'd heard a flare, them talking about setting off flares so we gave our

position and a bearing to the flares to the ship. There was so much a lot of clutter that after a point of couple of hours a ship was fairly confident they'd picked up the yacht on radar and as they were capable of travelling at 10 to 13 knots, you know, they were obviously going to get there a heap quicker than we were, so, they went off and simultaneously there seemed to be some dialogue with Eden Coastal Patrol organising a fishing boat to go and tow them in.

Q26 Righto. And you don't recall the name of that fishing boat or picking up any of the dialogue in relation to that?

A Not the fishing boat, like there was sort of talk about it, but we were concentrating on finding or at least assisting the, the merchant ship.

Q27 You, you don't recall hearing the names Moira Elizabeth?

A Moira sounds familiar.

Q28 Or the Josephine Jane?

A No. No. The ship was, I probably got the information at home, our boat was pretty well pulped inside, there was a lot of water.

Q29 Yeah.

A It was fairly hard to find things to write on but you know, we just jotted things down on chart as best we could.

Q30 Yeah. You mentioned earlier about doing plots, did you

receive that information from GPS and you plot it on a chart or did you maintain positions using the electronic chart plotter.

A No, I manually plot them on chart.

Q31 Yep.

A Every hour we would do that, we'd certainly write in a log and the crew are all, if I'm off watch or I just say to the crew, if you're going past just jot a lat and long if nothing else into the book, you know, if you're going to make a cup of a coffee - - -

Q32 Yep.

A - - - while you're doing it just write it down, because if you do lose your electronics it gives you a recent position to dead reckon from and that's, that's been a policy on the boat for years and all of the crew know how to do that, but, when we went into our survival mode, where I was updating every 15 minutes, we wouldn't bother plotting every 15 minutes, you'd just have a whole lot of dots close together - - -

Q33 Yep.

A - - - but, you know, we'd probably mark it off on the chart every hour.

Q34 Yep, yep. O.K. So then you, you've turned away and you've, you've started to head, head back as you were saying, what was, what happened after that?

A Well, the weather had really dropped out considerably by then but we had a bit of damage on the boat, not, you know, we had, had a tiller extension sheared, a

-
lifeline severed, we had a problem with the forestay, we were having difficulty getting the sails changed, we'd damaged our mainsail, so, in view of the hiding that we felt we had and I was particularly worried about Gary, I wanted him to have a good rest and see how he pulled up the next morning. We, we decided that we would just head back up towards Gabo and we were only doing 2 knots and we weren't really making a lot of ground, next morning, more and more crew came up and we started sort of heading up, we ended up about 10 mile north of Eden, and we started doing the repairs and then all the crew were well and Gary was happy and we decided that we'd resume the race, so, we headed down towards Gabo, and we stuck our neck out past Gabo and the weather was still out there up around, we thought around 40 knots, we went back we decided we still weren't really interested in getting a hiding and we went back for another hour, did another turn and went back and then it was 25 knots, so we proceeded across Bass Strait, it was similar sort of wind direction but only 20 to 25 knots, so a nice broad reach, which is what most yachties would like, we made good time across Bass Strait, the only incident was our HF radio at that point failed, but, fortunately in my profession I'm an electronics technician in marine and I have the training and skill and to be able to do repairs which was repair a circuit board which had burnt out tracks, I had a

..... soldering iron on board and I was able to get it going and we were really giving it a high priority because we were quite aware that people would worry if we didn't come up on a sked, especially in Bass Strait, so, so, I missed a sked, but when we got the radio going we called Telstra immediately, told them that we'd had trouble with our radio and if we had any more trouble we would proceed straight to St Helens and attempt to call them on VHF for that reason.

Q35 And then you just continued further on down the coast uneventful and then straight into the Derwent.

A Yeah, yeah, normal sailing stuff, wind dropped out and there was light air, then a bit more and the rest of the race is fairly uneventful.

Q36 Right. O.K. Well, that's very good. I'll just draw your attention to a document I have here, it's the application for entry form into the Telstra Sydney to Hobart Yacht Race. Is that the document that you submitted to the CYCA?

A Yes, it is and that's my signature.

Q37 O.K. Just on the last page, correction, on page number 2 of the document, it gives the name of, names of three of your crew.

A Mm.

Q38 Prior to leaving Sydney on the Sydney to Hobart journey down are they, did those three crew maintain on your vessel?

A Yes, they did.

Q39 O.K. Detective Gray, have you got any questions at this stage?

DETECTIVE SENIOR CONSTABLE GRAY

Q40 Yeah, just a couple, thanks. When you say that the storm sort of rapidly built, can you give us a time, over a period of time?

A Well, I'd guess I'd have to sort of define what I call a storm, you know, like even when at, when it was around 60, it sort of settled, it seemed to settle like that for possibly an hour or two.

Q41 Right.

A And then it started to sort of creep up and up and up until it it eventually got to 80, but it was, it was sort of sitting 60 to 65 for a, you know, a couple of hours - - -

Q42 Yeah.

A - - - and we thought that was the peak of it, but it turned out not to be the case.

Q43 So what do you understand as a skipper, what do you understand as a storm warning?

A Well, a storm warning really I, I would put as, well, firstly, it's wind strength, average wind strengths in excess of 42 knots, and an average is considered as 10 minute average, so, if you had wind strengths predicted at 42 knots, you, you should still expect gusts of perhaps another 10 knots long and short duration gusts.

Q44 O.K. Now in relation to the communications during the race so far as weather reports which came through

Telstra Control, were you happy with that?

A Um -

Q45 Anything you'd like to say in relation to
coms?

A No, well, there's plenty I'd like to say about the
coms, firstly, I'd like to say that Lou Carter was an
absolute professional and what I'm about to say should
not in any way impinge on my respect for his ability
and the situation he found himself in, but, it
surprised me that they had to divert him to Wollongong
to get another HF radio, I mean, surely, a giant the
size of Telstra
should have had a standby radio. There seemed to be
considerable difficulty in range, there seemed to be a
lot of messages relayed but I can't be sure whether
that's because the originating yachts are not up
scratch or the installation on Telstra race control,
Young Endeavour, was inadequate, but it did seem to,
they seemed to struggle at times. With regard to the
weather, this is a difficult one for me because as a
skipper you're really charged with getting information
as best you can through numerous things, I did tend, in
retrospect, to rely on the information we got from
Telstra, two weather updates a day wasn't enough,
particularly in the case of the severe weather
conditions we found and you look at some of
the documentaries it's fairly clear to me that some of
the senior forecasters were quite aware that it was

going to be a quite a blow and this information, in my view, didn't get through to the fleet through Telstra race control. And, and, you know, it's hard to say who was at fault, whether the bureau didn't do it or Telstra didn't do it or we should've checked other coastal stations, but, certainly had anyone known that that weather was going to be so severe, they would've enter Bass Strait, there's, apparently on Four Corners, they said 90 knots measured at Wilsons Prom, that bit of information would have been fairly critical to us.

Q46 So, you never heard that?

A No, well, I never heard it broadcast through Telstra race control and were maintaining a listening watch continually on that frequency.

Q47 Now, what were the wave heights that you can recall?

A I thought a lot about that and I'm sort of, quite happy to say that they were exceeding in, in a range from 10 to 15 metres, however, there were some really big ones, much bigger than that, probably 20 metres, so, you know, I'm sort of aware that it doesn't need to be a fisherman's story that they get bigger with every beer but, you know, a 10 metre wave is, that, that's the minimum height I would've said in the peak of the storm. The, when the winds actually got up around 80, the tops of the waves were blown off, so, it's pretty hard to sort of gauge how big they were, but they may have actually been smaller than they were at 65,

because the tops were blown off them.

Q48 Now, in relation to your entry to the Sydney to Hobart, you complete an application form that you've been shown?

A Yes.

Q49 And you submitted a number of documents.

A That's right.

Q50 Now, you submitted a IMS certificate, sorry, PHS certificate.

A What you have in front of you there is an old IMS certificate which was done probably about 1994, it's not a current certificate. There have been some modifications to the boat, there's been some ballast taken out of it, about 200 kilograms, but in the past we've had the boat's stability re-assessed and provided information to the CYC saying that it still conformed in terms of stability.

Q51 So, there's documentation, right up to date documentation at the CYCA so far as stability as concerned?

A You will find that that certificate is the main measurements of the thing, but, there, there is a cover letter from that, that states that despite the ballast being taken out, it still meets the stability requirement.

Q52 So as far as you're aware your stability index is around 115.7 still?

A Mm.

-

Q53 O.K.

A Yes.

Q54 Now, another tricky question here, but can you tell me if anybody in your crew, one of your crew would know what the, the stability rating of the vessel is offhand?

A No, no.

Q55 Is that the sort of, is it the sort of practice for you tell your crew that stability rating this year is 115 or last year it was 112 and we've done this and we've or do they accept your judgement?

A No, they'd be fairly accepting of what I do and certainly the crew, some of the crew don't normally sail with me, but the ones that do are in fact involved in when we removed the lead, but, I make a point and that's why I got the boat restabilised, well, re-checked, was to be sure it still didn't compromise the stability for the offshore racing.

Q56 Just, just keeping in mind, though, that the 1995 certificate here that we've got has got a stability index of 115 decimal 7, and the calculated limited, limited positive stability is 117 degrees.

A Mm.

Q57 And of course if the vessel was racing under the IMS grouping, well, then of course they take the higher of the two to allow that, at which you fit into category 1 under that under that standard. Now, taking off 200 kilograms of lead, where was that, where

was the actual ballast ...

A That was lead expoxied into the hull, pretty well forard of the keel.

Q58 Right.

A So, the effect it actually had on the boat was it made it a lot more stable boat when running downwind. The boat was very hard to control in a running sea, on the extreme of running spinnakers the boat will get into rolls and broaches and things like that, so, to take that out it gave us better control.

Q59 All right. And it was 200 kilos of lead?

A Yeah.

Q60 Approximately.

A We measured it.

Q61 O.K. And who was the measurer then when these alterations were made?

A That was done by the Royal Yacht Club's measurer John Honeysett and you'll probably find he does all of the Hobart boats.

Q62 Right. So, you elected at that stage then not to have an IMS certificate pre-issued but to go with the PHS category?

A Yes, there, there are other things that we did to the boat as well, including installing a masthead spinnaker.

Q63 Yep.

A And the information that we had when we researched it, it was going to make us completely non-competitive,

but, you know, we're very keen club racers and we don't have the budgets of the, the big guys have so we sort of think that, you know, a mast head spinnaker will give us more, more fun for our dollar than doing silly little hull alterations and new keels and all that stuff that they have to do in Sydney to be in competitive in IMS, so, so, in answer to your question, the reason that we didn't revalidate in IMS was because we, we had good information that we would be uncompetitive should we choose to declare that mast head spinnaker.

Q64 O.K. And, and the case is basically then there's no need to inform the Australian Yachting Federation or the CYCA of any alterations, however, as a long as a letter of compliance is forwarded, you're quite satisfied with that?

A Well, there's certainly no, the question is never asked, do we have a mast head spinnaker.

Q65 Mm.

A We certainly are obliged to inform our local clubs if we do any alterations because it affects our performance, that has to be declared, but we expect that in a performance handicap it's a sort of, it's a very difficult measure things and outcomes and under, in our case the performance of the boat and the crew is assessed, and that causes a lot of problem, no doubt, for CYC, because we race in Hobart, and I got to race against a

-
boat in Sydney and another one in Melbourne, so, the relative things between the boats is a different, difficult thing, now, I would imagine that what CYC would do in that situation would say would talk to local yacht clubs, the own squadron, and they would get a little guesstimate, how does it go to a benchmark boat, like a 37, and what is it's strength, does it go fast that sort of thing.

Q66 Yep.

A They would get that information if they talk to the other clubs.

Q67 Do you feel the PHS rating is a fair rating to be in a category 1 race.

A PHS has got some problems, are you asking in terms of being competitive or, or in terms of safety aspect?

Q68 The safety aspect.

A Yeah. The boat I had is well-known, it, it was called Bidwill Gundy. It raced for Australia in the Cup. It was a runner up in the Sydney to Hobart in the early 90s, so there's a lot of history about it's ocean going ability, so with that in view, I think that it would be reasonable for a club to accept our entry because it has a long history of performance in the ocean, it's not a radical boat, it's not innovative, it is a well-founded OIR design and the modifications that have been done to it are not necessarily going to affect the stability, if it's

-
blowing you're not going to use your masthead
spinnaker, 'cause that will just blow the masthead
..... out, so, in terms of safety, I don't see that,
but there probably could be more radical boats that
don't have the history or the testing involved, boats
like have.

Q69 Do you think that these vessels should be more
scrutinised by the CYCA, in regards to their, their
stability rating and the safety aspects of the vessels?

A Well, I think what, what has to happen and as far as
I'm aware what, what does happen is when you do change
from checking, if you do anything that's going to
affect the safety, it has to be re-assessed. That's
why we got the boat re-rated, you know, perhaps if we
were just racing around the harbour we wouldn't bother,
you know, because, you know, we don't have that
obligation.

Q70 But on a broad sort of a spectrum is it, is it quite
fair to say if you've got a 1995 IMS certificate, and
you make a few changes to the boat and you do a few
other things, you really don't have to inform the CYCA
of that do you, if you just say O.K. I want to go into
the PHS now, but, however, here's my old IMS
certificate?

A I'm not quite sure what you mean but the intention of
providing an out of date certificate really is to give
them a bit of measurement data, when one of the things
you can do in calculating PHS is you look at the length

of the boat, the sail area, the displacement and you put it into a, into a so that was the intention of getting that as well as, you know, the supplementary information provided that said that it still met stability.

Q71 O.K. All right. Is there anything you'd further you'd like to add about the race, the conduct of the club perhaps, your performance, any, anything that might come to mind that you feel might, might assist us in our inquiries?

A Well, I provided the the documents to the CYC supplementary to the questionnaire and I'm quite open about some of the things that I thought that we didn't do well and that should've done, the things I'm talking about is life raft drills, now, not many people actually have been in a life raft, I have because I work in the industry, but it was in a, in a swimming pool, now I think that yacht clubs in general if they're supporting boats that go offshore should be providing some form of training. The Derwent Sailing Squadron is going to do that this year incidentally, but the crew should be quite familiar with what happens when you pull that tether, how to ride them, what you're going to experience, the whole deal and it needs to be done in, perhaps in you don't need a gale, but you need people to be cold and sleepy and, and, you know, it needs obviously to be properly done, the other thing is that, you know, practice flare

firing, all these sort of things you shouldn't be learning this when you really have to do it and so our squadron has undertaken to that, already has a training school and that will be done for the offshore sailors this year. In my submission to the CYC I suggested that they could do, do them on the morning of the race as well.

Q72 Well, that, that brings to me a point. Were you aware of life raft demonstrations and flare demonstrations that were advertised at the Hobart Yacht Club and the CYC prior to the race?

A No. No, I wasn't, in, in either case, the only thing I'm aware of and I should say that I'm the vice-commodore of the Derwent Sailing Squadron, so I'm sort of in a privileged position that when we do competent crew training, the, the principal of our training school, who actually sailed on our boat, has made it very broadly known that any other boat that wants to come out and fire flares during our training thing are most welcome to do so, so, that's, that's, that's the point I guess I'm making is I should've taken up that opportunity and I didn't.

Q73 O.K. All right, then, nothing else you'd like to add?

A Not offhand.

Q74 O.K. All right. Well, the time on my watch now is 11.41. The interview is now concluded.

INTERVIEW CONCLUDED